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Abstract
The trading of securities on multiple markets raises the question of each market’s share
in the discovery of the informationally eﬃcient price. We exploit salient distributional
features of multivariate ﬁnancial price processes to uniquely determine these contri-
butions. Thereby we resolve the main drawback of the widely used Hasbrouck (1995)
methodology which merely delivers upper and lower bounds of a market’s information
share. When these bounds diverge, as is the case in many applications, informa-
tional leadership becomes blurred. We show how fat tails and tail dependence of price
changes, which emerge as a result of diﬀerences in market design and liquidity, can be
exploited to estimate unique information shares. The empirical application of the new
methodology emphasizes the leading role of the credit derivatives market compared to
the corporate bond market in pricing credit risk during the pre-crisis period.
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One of the most frequently asked questions in empirical ﬁnance is “Where is the market?”
Whether in the case of cross-listings of stocks or newly developed derivative markets, this
question has stirred up an enormous amount of research. Booth et al. (2002), for instance,
examine the role of upstairs and downstairs markets in the price discovery process at the
Helsinki Stock Exchange, while Huang (2002) estimates the contributions of market mak-
ers and electronic crossing networks to the price formation of NASDAQ stocks. Hasbrouck
(2003) analyzes the importance of diﬀerent trading venues for the price discovery process
of US equity indices. The share of the futures market in US treasury price discovery is the
focus of a study by Mizrach and Neely (2008), and Blanco et al. (2005) estimate the share
of the bond market and the market of credit default swaps in the process of pricing credit
risk. While dealing with the same question in diﬀerent trading environments, all these
studies report Hasbrouck (1995) information shares which is the most prevalent approach
to measure contributions to price discovery.
In this paper we resolve the main drawback of Hasbrouck’s (1995) methodology which does
not deliver a unique measure, but merely information share upper and lower bounds. These
bounds can diverge considerably and hinder a clear detection of the market that leads price
discovery. Our approach identiﬁes unique information shares by exploiting distributional
properties of ﬁnancial data, namely fat tails and tail dependence. Thereby we deliver a
more accurate measure which can be applied to study price discovery in various ﬁelds of
ﬁnancial research.
Within Hasbrouck’s methodology, information shares are deﬁned as each market’s contribu-
tion to the variance of the eﬃcient price innovations. However, within a vector equilibrium
correction framework the eﬃcient price variance can generally not be decomposed without
further restrictions. For that purpose Hasbrouck (1995) uses the Cholesky factorization
2of the innovation covariance matrix which implies a hierarchical ordering in terms of the
contemporaneous information ﬂow. Permuting the ordering of markets results in upper and
lower information share bounds. When these bounds diverge, they measure contributions
to price discovery very inaccurately.
Our approach towards estimating unique information shares is related to the identiﬁcation
of structural shocks through heteroskedasticity (see Rigobon 2003) and non-normal inno-
vations (see Lanne and L¨ utkepohl 2010). These papers show that structural innovations
within a multiple time series framework can be identiﬁed if the data exhibit heteroskedas-
ticity that can be described by a multi-regime process associated with diﬀerent innovation
variances. We connect this insight with two salient facts of ﬁnancial price processes: fat
tailed return distributions combined with tail dependence. We show how these features,
which may result from diﬀerences in market liquidity, can be exploited to disentangle the
contemporaneous correlations of the price innovations across markets. In particular, the
occurrence of a large price movement in one market can either represent an informative
event or a transitory liquidity shock. Contemporaneous price movements of the other mar-
kets reveal the informational content of the large price change, and thereby identify market
idiosyncratic innovations. Those tell-tale tail observations are the key to deliver unique
information shares.
Drawing on the approach put forth by Lanne and L¨ utkepohl (2010), we assume that mar-
ket idiosyncratic price innovations come from mixture distributions, and that the observed
(composite) price innovations emerge as a linear combination of these structural shocks.
We show that the resulting multivariate mixture distribution can account for fat tails and
tail dependence, which we exploit for the computation of unique information shares. The
basic data requirement to achieve this goal is that the correlations of the market price
innovations in the tails and in the center of their joint distribution are suﬃciently diﬀerent.
3Since there are no identifying restrictions suggested by ﬁnance theory, the possibility to
disentangle the contemporaneous correlation structure of price innovations based on dis-
tributional properties of ﬁnancial data is quite appealing. However, we also show that in
the absence of further restrictions it is only possible to determine the set of information
shares, but not to allocate them uniquely to the markets. We oﬀer a solution by proposing
identifying restrictions which naturally arise from the one security-multiple markets frame-
work. They require that the idiosyncratic price innovation originating in one market exerts
a stronger contemporaneous impact on its own price than on all the other markets. These
restrictions enable us to estimate unique market information shares.
We use the new methodology to measure the contribution of the credit default swap and
the corporate bond market to the pricing of credit risk. The results emphasize the informa-
tional leadership of the more liquid credit derivatives market during the pre-crisis period.
They also corroborate the conclusions of previous studies that identify relative market liq-
uidity as the most important variable for explaining market information shares (see Yan
and Zivot 2010). Liquidity, as a result of market design, attracts trading volume and pro-
motes a market’s leadership in price discovery. Our methodology systematically exploits
the informational content of those market design eﬀects to deliver a unique measure of a
market’s information share.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a short review
of Hasbrouck’s (1995) approach to measure contributions to price discovery. Section three
motivates and explains our new methodology, addresses and resolves identiﬁcation issues
and describes the estimation strategy. In Section four we present and discuss the results
of the empirical application. Section ﬁve concludes.
42 Hasbrouck information shares
The law of one price dictates that prices quoted on diﬀerent trading venues which refer to
the same asset cannot diverge in the long run, since traders who seize arbitrage opportu-
nities will force them back together. Assume that in the case of n parallel markets trading
the same asset the dynamics of the vector of market prices pt = (p1,t,...,pn,t)′ can be
described by a vector autoregression of order q. Granger’s representation theorem then
implies a vector equilibrium correction model (VECM),
∆pt = αβ′pt−1 + Γ1∆pt−1 + ... + Γq−1∆pt−q+1 + ut , (2.1)
where ut = (u1,t,...,un,1)′ is vector white noise with zero mean and covariance matrix
Σu. The (n×n−1) matrix β collects the n−1 linearly independent cointegrating vectors.
Hasbrouck (1995) proposes to normalize β using the ﬁrst market price as a benchmark, i.e.
β′=[ιn−1 −In−1], where ιn−1 denotes an n − 1 dimensional column unit vector and In−1
the identity matrix of dimension n − 1. Further, α is an (n × n − 1) matrix of adjustment
coeﬃcients, and Γ1 through Γq−1 are (n × n) parameter matrices.
A cointegrating rank of h = n − 1 implies that there exists one stochastic trend common
to all n market prices, which is associated with the notion of the eﬃcient price of the
underlying asset. It is driven by the permanent impact of idiosyncratic innovations in each
of the market’s price series. Idiosyncratic innovations are contemporaneously and serially
uncorrelated zero mean unit variance random variables, εt = (ε1,t,..,εn,t)′ ∼ (0,In). They
relate to the composite price innovations by ut = Bεt, where B denotes a (n×n) parameter
matrix. Johansen (1995) shows that in a VECM as in Equation (2.1) the long run impacts







with β⊥ and α⊥ the orthogonal complements of β and α. In general, Ξ is of rank n − h.
Consequently, in the present application Ξ is of rank one and contains identical rows.
Stock and Watson’s (1988) common trends representation implies that the innovations to
the eﬃcient price are given by vt = ξ′Bεt, where ξ′ denotes the common row vector in Ξ.
The variance of the eﬃcient price innovations
Var(vt) = ξ′Σuξ = ξ′BB′ξ (2.3)
is a weighted sum of the idiosyncratic (unit) variances. The relative market weights deﬁne
Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share measure.
In order to identify B, Hasbrouck (1995) uses the Cholesky factorization of Σu = CC′,
where C is the lower triangular Cholesky matrix, such that B = C. The (1 × n) vector of





where (2) denotes an element-wise squaring, such that the ith element of the vector IS gives
the information share of market i.
Due to the arbitrary ordering of the markets in the Cholesky factorization, the information
shares in (2.4) are not unique. Since idiosyncratic shocks in a market contemporaneously
aﬀect only those markets that have a lower rank in the ordering, the contribution of the
market ordered ﬁrst is maximized and that of the market ordered last is minimized. As
6there is generally no theoretical justiﬁcation for such a hierarchy, the common procedure is
to permutate the ordering, which results in information share upper and lower bounds. The
main drawback of Hasbrouck’s methodology is that these bounds can diverge considerably.
Hupperets and Menkveld (2002), for instance, examine US listed Dutch blue chip stocks
and estimate lower and upper bound information shares that diﬀer by up to 50 percentage
points. The information share bounds found by Booth et al. (2002) for the upstairs and
downstairs markets at the Helsinki Stock Exchange diverge by about 80 percentage points.
3 Fat tails, tail dependence, and unique information shares
3.1 Motivation and econometric speciﬁcation
The identiﬁcation of variance shares and idiosyncratic innovations is a prevalent problem
in various ﬁelds of economics. As an alternative to the Cholesky decomposition, macroe-
conomic VAR analyses exploit theoretically motivated restrictions on long run eﬀects, by
imposing constraints on ΞB, and/or short run eﬀects, by imposing restrictions on B (see
L¨ utkepohl 2008). However, ﬁnance theory does not suggest such restrictions concerning the
one security-multiple markets framework. As a result, the indeterminacy of Hasbrouck’s
information share measure remained a caveat for 15 years.1
Our proposed solution exploits two stylized facts of ﬁnancial price processes: fat tails and
tail dependence. Fat tails mean that large negative or positive price changes occur more
frequently than predicted by a normal distribution (see e.g. Haas et al. 2004). By tail
dependence we refer to the phenomenon that the correlation of price changes in the tails
of the distribution is diﬀerent from that in the center (see e.g. Longin 2001). While these
empirical facts are not at odds with ﬁnance theory, there are no ﬁrst principles explanations
1 An attempt to resolve the problem was put forth by Lien and Shrestha (2009) who propose an alternative
decomposition of the innovation correlation matrix. However, the economic motivation behind their
methodology is unclear.
7for their existence.
Before we outline the mathematical details of our methodology, let us ﬁrst illustrate how
fat tails and tail dependence can help disentangle the contemporaneous correlation of the
price innovations. For that purpose we follow Rigobon (2003) who uses scatter plots to
visualize identiﬁcation through heteroskedasticity. Our illustration focuses on the case of
n = 2 markets.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The three panels in Figure 1 depict scatter plots of composite price innovations u1 and u2.
The upward sloping regression lines indicate the positive contemporaneous correlation of
the price innovations on the two markets. All three panels show price innovations clustering
in the dense center of the bivariate distributions. In Panels I and II the correlations of
the innovations in the center and in the tails of the bivariate distribution are distinctly
diﬀerent. Price innovations in the dense center of the Panel I distribution are positively
correlated. However, tail observations in market two do not tend to be accompanied by
particularly large absolute values of u1. The Panel II data also exhibit tail dependence,
but the correlation in the dense center is smaller than in the tails. Here the marginal
distribution of u1 is more leptokurtic, with price innovations that are mostly small in
absolute value, but with occasional large positive or negative shocks. If, however, there is
a large and positive (negative) innovation in market one, then the market two innovation
tends to be large and positive (negative), too. The converse does not hold true: The
horizontally ﬂattened dense center of the Panel II scatter plot implies that extreme market
two price innovations do not tend to be accompanied by u1 observations that are large in
absolute value.
An economic explanation for such observations is that the design of the trading process on
market two may entail temporary shortages of liquidity, which cause large absolute price
8changes. These liquidity shocks on market two do not aﬀect the common eﬃcient price,
and thus do not contemporaneously spill over to market one. As it turns out, such market
imperfections are very useful for our quest. They reveal the contemporaneous dependence

























the Panel I and II scatterplots suggest that the weight b1,2, which transfers an idiosyncratic
price shock occurring on market two into the price innovation of market one, is small, while
b2,1 is large.
Let us now set up a statistical model that accounts for fat tails and tail dependence. For
that purpose, we draw on Lanne and L¨ utkepohl’s (2010) idea to identify structural shocks
in a VAR framework by assuming mixture distributions for the residuals. Such an assump-
tion may not be obvious or sensible in a macroeconomic analysis involving variables like
GDP, money supply, unemployment and interest rates. In the present application, how-
ever, it perfectly matches the stylized facts observed in ﬁnancial data.
We retain the factor structure ut = Bεt = Wet, where W denotes a non-singular matrix,
and et is an n-dimensional vector of contemporaneously and serially uncorrelated innova-





e1,t ∼ N (0,In) with probability γ
e2,t ∼ N (0,Ψ) with probability 1 − γ ,
(3.2)
where 0 < γ < 1 and Ψ is a diagonal matrix with positive elements ψ1,..,ψn.
As shown by Rigobon (2003), the identiﬁcation of structural shocks through heteroskedas-
ticity relies on the existence of regimes with diﬀerent innovation variances. Unlike Rigobon
9(2003), who assumes exogenously deﬁned variance regimes, Equation (3.2) speciﬁes only a
regime probability. This entails the necessity to deal with and deliver identifying restric-
tions. We will address this issue in the next section and for now assume that the set of
mixture parameters θm = {γ,Ψ,W} can be uniquely identiﬁed.
It follows from (3.2) that the covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic innovations et is given
by
Σe = γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ , (3.3)
such that
Σu = BB′ = WΣeW′ , (3.4)
which implies that B = WΣ0.5
e . Information shares which are independent of the ordering










where θv = {α,β,Γ1,...,Γq} collects the VECM parameters. The X subscript indicates
that the identiﬁcation of information shares exploits the informational content of extreme
(tail) observations.
Figure 2 illustrates how mixture of normal distributions can produce fat tails and tail
dependence. The three Panels reveal that the innovations displayed in Figure 1 were
drawn from bivariate normal mixtures with a low and a high variance regime.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Tail dependence prevails in Panels I and II, since here ψ1  = ψ2, while in Panel III ψ1 = ψ2.
Identical regime variances imply that the correlation of the innovations is the same in the
10low and the high variance regime. In other words, the dependence of innovations in the
tails of the distribution is not diﬀerent from that in the center when ψ1 = ψ2. Figure 2
also reveals that the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the weight matrix W are as suspected by
eyeballing the Panel I and II scatter plots in Figure 1. The parameter w1,2 − the weight
with which the idiosyncratic market two innovation e2 contemporaneously aﬀects the price
on market one − is smaller than w2,1, the weight with which the market one idiosyncratic
innovation e1 contemporaneously aﬀects the price on market two.
Fat tails along with tail dependence represent the basic data features to successfully apply
our methodology. Using mixtures of normal distributions, with regime variances that are
diﬀerent across markets, one can account for these features in a statistical model. However,
as we will outline in the next section, additional restrictions are required to identify the
vector of ISX information shares according to Equation (3.5).
3.2 Identiﬁcation
The identiﬁcation of unique information shares involves two aspects, namely to determine
the set of information shares and to allocate them to the n markets. As shown by Lanne
and L¨ utkepohl (2010), the identiﬁcation of the weighting matrix W requires that the
diagonal elements of Ψ (the idiosyncratic innovation variances) are all diﬀerent. This
result corresponds to Rigobon’s (2003) ﬁnding that in order to permit identiﬁcation through
heteroskedasticity the regime variances have to be diﬀerent.
In particular, Lanne and L¨ utkepohl (2010) show that if Ψ contains diﬀerent elements on
its main diagonal, then the columns of W are identiﬁed up to a multiplication of one
or many of its columns by −1. However, being able to identify the columns of W only
up to a sign shift does not aﬀect the information shares computed according to Equation
(3.5). Furthermore, the sign indeterminacy can be easily resolved by restricting the main
11diagonal elements of W to be greater than zero. This is a sensible restriction in almost
any application. In the context of the present paper it implies that an idiosyncratic price
innovation on market i, ei,t, contemporaneously impacts on the composite innovation ui,t
with the same sign and a nonzero weight.
However, distinct main diagonal elements of Ψ ensure the identiﬁcation of the columns of
W, but not their ordering. The consequences are severe, as it is only possible to identify
the set of information shares, but not to assign them uniquely to the n markets. As we
prove in Appendix A, there exist n! possibilities to allocate information shares to the n
markets. These information share vectors result from alternative parametrizations which
are observationally equivalent to θm = {γ,Ψ,W}. They imply the same joint density of
the random vector ut which, resulting from Equation (3.2) and ut = Wet, is given by
















We refer the reader to Appendix A for a formal proof. The key insight is that distinct di-
agonal elements of Ψ identify W uniquely only if the ordering of the columns of W cannot
be altered. However, the re-parametrization θ∗
m = {γ,Ψ∗,W∗}, where W∗ = WP and
Ψ∗ = P′ΨP, with P a permutation matrix of order n, is observationally equivalent to the
original parametrization θm = {γ,Ψ,W}, such that f(ut;θ∗
m) = f(ut;θm).2 This implies
that there exist n! − 1 sets of mixture parameters which are observationally equivalent
to the original parametrization. Furthermore, there exist n! additional parametrizations
2 A permutation matrix P results from permuting the rows of an identity matrix. Every row and column
therefore contains one element that equals one and the remaining elements are zero. Consequently,
there exist n! distinct permutation matrices of order n, one of which is the identity matrix. Post-(pre-)
multiplication by a permutation matrix results in a matrix where the columns (rows) of a matrix are
interchanged according to the permutation implied P. The operation WP thus permutes the columns
of W. The operation P
′ΨP permutes the diagonal elements of Ψ accordingly.
12˜ θm = {˜ γ,   Ψ,   W} where   W = WΨ0.5P,   Ψ = P′Ψ−1P and ˜ γ = 1 − γ. These parametriza-
tions are also observationally equivalent to θm.
As we show in Appendix A, these alternative parametrizations permute the original infor-
mation shares according to
ISX(θ∗
m,θv) = ISX(˜ θm,θv) = ISX(θm,θv) × P , (3.7)
such that there exist n! diﬀerent, but observationally equivalent information share vectors.
In other words, it is impossible to determine which information share belongs to a single
market.
Equation (3.7) implies that in order to ensure identiﬁcation we need additional restrictions
that prevent the permutation of the columns of W and the diagonal elements of Ψ. For-
tunately, the one security-multiple markets application framework suggests the following
constraints:
wi,i > 0 ∀ i
wi,i > |wj,i| ∀ j  = i ,
(3.8)
where wi,j is the row i, column j element W. The restriction that the diagonal elements
of W are larger than the remaining elements in the same column is economically plausible,
since we expect the weight with which the idiosyncratic shock originating in market i, ei,t,
contemporaneously aﬀects the own market composite price innovation ui,t to be larger in
absolute value than the weights with which it contemporaneously aﬀects the composite
price innovations of all other markets.
The restrictions in (3.8) leave P = In as the only eligible permutation matrix. The two re-
maining parametrizations θm and θm = {1−γ,Ψ−1,WΨ0.5} imply the same allocation of
information shares to the n markets. Restricting one of the regime variances to be greater
than one leaves θm as the only eligible parametrization. Together with the restriction that
13all elements of Ψ are distinct, the constraints in (3.8) suﬃce to identify the set of informa-
tion shares and allocate them uniquely.
3.3 Estimation
Maximum Likelihood presents the natural method to estimate the model parameters. Using
ut = A(L)pt, where
A(L) = 1 − L − αβ′L − Γ1∆L − ... − Γq−1∆Lq−1 (3.9)






















Estimation of the VECM parameters θv and the mixture parameters θm in a single step is
computationally burdensome. We therefore adopt the two-step estimation strategy outlined
by L¨ utkepohl (2005) and Vlaar (2004). The ﬁrst step either estimates the cointegrating
vectors, or uses those suggested by theory (i.e. β′=[ιn−1 −In−1]). Equation by equation
OLS of (2.1) then delivers consistent estimates of θv which can be used to compute an
estimate of the long run impacts vector ξ from Equation (2.2). The second estimation
step maximizes the concentrated log-likelihood which results from replacing the VECM
parameters in (3.10) by their ﬁrst step estimates, i.e. ut is replaced by
  ut = (1 − L −   α  β
′
L −   Γ1∆L − ... −   Γq−1∆Lq−1)pt , (3.11)
14to obtain estimates of θm. Maximization of the concentrated log-likelihood imposes the
identifying constraints (3.8). Plugging in the ﬁrst step estimates ˆ θv and the second step
estimates ˆ θm in (3.5) delivers ISX information share estimates. Standard errors for the
estimates resulting from this two-step procedure can be delivered by a parametric bootstrap
along the lines of MacKinnon (2002). Details are provided in Appendix B.
4 Empirical application
4.1 Credit default swaps, credit spread, and the price of credit risk
To illustrate the beneﬁt of our methodology we revisit a research question addressed by
Blanco et al. (2005) who quantify the information share of the corporate bond market and
the market for credit derivatives in pricing credit risk. Given the importance of credit
securitization and the controversial role played by credit derivatives during the recent
ﬁnancial crisis, research on this topic is more relevant than ever.
Both corporate bonds and credit derivatives, of which credit default swaps (CDSs) are
the most important instruments, are traded on over-the-counter markets. The corporate
bond market determines credit spreads (pCS), the diﬀerence between risky bond yields and
the risk-free rate. A CDS is a contract between two counterparties trading credit risk.
The protection buyer transfers default risk by paying a fee to the protection seller who is
willing to assume the risk. In return, the buyer receives a payoﬀ if the underlying ﬁnancial
instrument defaults. The economic eﬀect of a CDS is thus similar to that of an insurance
contract, but the buyer of credit protection via a CDS does not necessary have to hold
the insured security. The annualized fee, expressed in basis points of the notional volume,
is referred to as the CDS price (pCDS). Since credit spread and CDS price are linked
by an approximate arbitrage relation (see Duﬃe 1999, Hull and White 2000a, Hull and
15White 2000b), Blanco et al. (2005) assume cointegration between the two I(1) price series
such that pCDS,t − pCS,t is I(0).3
Blanco et al.’s (2005) study is an exemplary application of Hasbrouck’s (1995) methodology.
They set up the VECM in Equation (2.1) with p1,t = pCDS,t and p2,t = pCS,t. Here the
common stochastic trend can be interpreted as the price of credit risk. This research
question is especially interesting for the application of our methodology, since liquidity
matters on markets for credit risk. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) point out that movements
in liquidity premia explain a large proportion of the total variation in credit spreads.
As outlined in Section 3, diﬀerences in market liquidity are the key to identify unique
information shares.
4.2 Data
We make use of the data on CDS prices and credit spreads collected by Blanco et al.
(2005).4 The time series of CDS prices are midpoints of daily close- of-business indicative
quotes supplied by the CDS broker CreditTrade and J.P. Morgan Securities. The CDS
prices are for single-name standard ISDA benchmark contracts for physical settlement, a
notional volume of $ ten million, and ﬁve years maturity, the most liquid maturity in the
CDS market.5 Risky bond yields are from Bloomberg. By linearly interpolating yields
3 The arbitrage relation can be explained as follows. Suppose an investor buys a T-year par bond with
yield to maturity of y issued by the reference entity. The investor also buys credit protection on that
entity for T years at pCDS. The net annual return is y −pCDS which, by arbitrage, and because default
risk is eliminated, should be equal to the T-year risk-free rate denoted by x. If y − pCDS < x, then
shorting the risky bond, writing protection on the CDS market, and buying the risk free rate would
present an arbitrage opportunity. If y − pCDS > x, then buying the risky bond and protection, and
shorting the risk-free bond becomes proﬁtable. Accordingly, the price of the CDS should equal the credit
spread, pCDS = pCS = y −x. However, with market imperfections such as liquidity premia, not exactly
matching maturity dates, and cheapest to delivery options in case of default, the arbitrage relation is not
perfect. Assuming cointegration accounts for the approximate nature of the arbitrage relation between
CDS price and credit spread.
4 We are grateful to R. Blanco for making these data available.
5 The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) contracts deﬁne default events and ways
of settlement in case of default (cash or physical delivery, i.e. delivery of a reference asset).
16between three and ﬁve years and yields with more than six and a half years to maturity
at the start of the sample, a ﬁve-year yield to maturity is estimated to match the CDS
maturity. Euro and Dollar ﬁve year swap rates, respectively, are used as proxies for the
risk-free rate. The resulting time series of CDS prices and credit spreads for 33 reference
entities (16 US and 17 European companies) run from January 2, 2001 to June 20, 2002
(383 trading days). In the following, we focus on those 26 reference entities for which
the data support the existence of the hypothesized cointegrating relation (see Table III in
Blanco et al. 2005). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
4.3 Estimation results and discussion
Two-step estimation of ISX information shares is performed as described in Section 3.3.
Estimation results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. For the ﬁrst step estimation, we assume
the theoretical cointegrating vector β = (1,−1)′ and q = 2 in Equation (2.1). The ﬁrst
step estimates are used to compute upper and lower bounds of Hasbrouck information share
estimates and alternative measures of contributions to price discovery. Table 2 reports the
mixture parameter estimates and the Wald test results for the null hypothesis of identical
regime variances, ψ1 = ψ2. For all reference entities the null is rejected at conventional
signiﬁcance levels. As outlined above, this is a necessary condition for the identiﬁcation of
unique information shares according to our methodology.
Insert Table 2 about here
Along with ISX estimates, Table 3 contains lower and upper bounds of the Hasbrouck
information share estimates of the CDS market. We further include the estimates of the
long run impact coeﬃcients ξ = (ξCDS,ξCS)′, and the ratio of adjustment coeﬃcients
17λCS =
|αCS|
|αCDS|+|αCS|.6 Standard errors for these estimates as well as for Hasbrouck infor-
mation shares are obtained applying the non-parametric bootstrap procedure proposed by
Grammig et al. (2005).
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 shows that the mean of ˆ λCS, averaged across reference entities, amounts to 0.84.
This indicates a strong (weak) adjustment of the credit spread (CDS price) to previous
day price diﬀerences, suggesting that the corporate bond market follows the CDS market.7
The Hasbrouck information share estimates also indicate a larger contribution of the CDS
market to price discovery. While for some reference entities the bounds of the Hasbrouck
information shares are narrow, they are quite wide for others. For instance, the lower
bound of the CDS market Hasbrouck information share estimate for Ford amounts to 52.3
%, (s.e. = 20.3), the upper bound is 80.0 % (s.e. = 16.9).
The last column in Table 3 reports the estimates of the CDS market ISX information
shares. For the reference entity Ford the ISX estimate amounts to 83.4 % (s.e. = 16.8), a
value above the Hasbrouck information share upper bound estimate. Table 3 shows that
the more pronounced leadership of the CDS market indicated by our unique information
share measure is a general result. For those reference entities with wide bounds, the ISX
information shares tend to be close to the Hasbrouck information share upper bounds. The
CDS market ISX estimate averaged across entities amounts to 86.1 % which is close to the
mean upper bound of the Hasbrouck share.
This result of a distinct informational leadership of the more liquid CDS market corrobo-
6 Baillie et al. (2002) show that with β = (1,−1)





7 Adjustment coeﬃcient ratios are frequently reported in price discovery studies which deal with the one
security-two markets framework, often with a reference to Gonzalo and Granger (1995) factor weights (see
e.g. Booth et al. 1999, Harris et al. 2002, Eun and Sabherwal 2003). However, their use as a measure of
a market’s contribution to price discovery has been criticized on methodological and theoretical grounds
(see Hasbrouck 1995, Hasbrouck 2002, De Jong 2002, Lehmann 2002, Baillie et al. 2002).
18rates the conclusions of Grammig et al. (2008) who study price discovery for internationally
cross listed stocks and identify relative market liquidity as the most important variable for
explaining the information shares of home and foreign market. Liquidity, as a result of
market design, attracts trading volume and promotes a market’s leadership price discovery
(see also Yan and Zivot 2010). Our ﬁndings suggest that this conclusion also holds for
markets trading credit risk.
Insert Figure 3 about here
The scatter plots of the VECM residuals depicted in Figure 3 match and illustrate the
liquidity story. The four panels show horizontally ﬂattened dense centers of the bivariate
distributions, which imply that tail observations for the credit spread residuals do not tend
to be accompanied by extreme CDS residuals. However, when the CDS residual is large
and positive (negative), the credit spread residual tends to be large and positive (negative),
too. This pattern complies with the notion of a corporate bond market where transitory
price changes may occur only due to a lack of liquidity. Price innovations in the more liquid
CDS market, on the other hand, tend to convey information with respect to the price of
credit risk which spills over contemporaneously to the credit spreads.
The estimates of the weight matrix W reported in Table 2 are in line with these scatter
plots. The estimate of w2,1, the weight with which an idiosyncratic CDS innovation con-
temporaneously aﬀects the credit spread, tends to be larger than the estimate of w1,2, the
weight with which an idiosyncratic credit spread innovation contemporaneously aﬀects the
CDS price. The estimate of w1,2 is in most cases not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
relative illiquidity of the corporate bond market thus helps to identify contemporaneous
eﬀects and facilitates the estimation of unique information shares.
For some of the reference entities, the bounds of the Hasbrouck information shares are nar-
row because the contemporaneous correlations of the credit spread and CDS price residuals
19are small. In these cases, the estimates of the oﬀ-diagonal elements of W are small and
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and the ISX estimates are close to the Hasbrouck
information share midpoints. We take it as a sign of robustness that both the standard
identiﬁcation method and the one proposed in this paper deliver very similar results when
no ambiguity in terms of wide bounds prevails. Furthermore, the estimation precision in
terms of standard errors is comparable for Hasbrouck and ISX information shares. Hence,
the increase in precision oﬀered by our methodology is unambiguous.
5 Conclusion
“Where does price discovery take place?” is one of the key questions in empirical ﬁnance.
It is raised when studying the competition for order ﬂow between traditional and alter-
native trading platforms, national and international exchanges, and parallel markets for
traditional and innovative ﬁnancial instruments.
Hasbrouck’s (1995) methodology is the standard approach to address this research ques-
tion empirically. He proposes to estimate the information share for each of the parallel
markets on which ﬁnancial instruments linked by the law of one price are traded. Informa-
tion shares result from a variance decomposition of the innovations of the markets prices’
common stochastic trend which is associated with the notion of the eﬃcient price of the
underlying security.
The competitive edge of Hasbrouck’s information shares over alternative methodologies to
measure contributions to price discovery is widely accepted (see the synopsis by Lehmann
2002). However, most applications suﬀer from a lack of identiﬁcation since the contempo-
raneous dependence structure of price innovations across markets cannot be disentangled
without further restrictions. As a solution, Hasbrouck (1995) performs a Cholesky decom-
position of the covariance matrix of the price innovations. Thereby a hierarchical ordering
20of markets is assumed that is hardly ever justifyable. In empirical work researchers often
resort to permuting the ordering of the markets, which yields upper and lower bounds of
information shares rather than a unique measure. These bounds can become so wide that
it is impossible to determine even the leading market.
The present paper resolves the problem of indetermined information shares by exploiting
the informational content of distributional properties of ﬁnancial prices. We show that dif-
ferent dependencies of contemporaneous price innovations in the tails and in the center of
the distributions deliver the necessary information to determine unique information shares.
Such tail dependence can be caused by the design of the trading process which may induce
market speciﬁc liquidity eﬀects. Since in most applications of the Hasbrouck methodol-
ogy the market structures are clearly diﬀerent - this is why alternative trading platforms
emerge in the ﬁrst place - our methodology presents an appealing solution. Regarding the
pricing of credit risk, it is the relatively higher liquidity of the CDS market compared to
the corporate bond market which sharpens the ﬁnding of the informational leadership of
the credit derivatives market during the pre-crisis period.
The relation between market liquidity and contributions to price discovery has recently
been emphasized by Yan and Zivot (2010). Our methodology systematically exploits the
informational content of those market design eﬀects and thereby delivers a unique measure
for a market’s information share. Researchers concerned with quantifying contributions to
price discovery have a new tool to sharpen their conclusions.
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A Identiﬁcation: propositions and proofs
Proposition 1. Denote by θm = {γ,Ψ,W} the set of mixture parameters that yields
the density of f(ut;θm) given in Equation (3.6), and by θv = {α,β,Γ1,...,Γq} a set of
VECM parameters. Suppose the main diagonal elements of W are all greater than zero,
and that the elements of the diagonal matrix Ψ are distinct. Furthermore, let ISX(θm,θv)
denote the vector of information shares given by Equation (3.5). Then, holding the mixture
probability γ ﬁxed, there exist n! − 1 further sets of mixture parameters θ∗
m = {γ,Ψ∗,W∗}
given by n!−1 distinct permutations of the columns in W and the corresponding elements
in Ψ,
Ψ∗ = P′ΨP (A.1)
W∗ = WP (A.2)
where P is a permutation matrix of order n. The parametrizations θ∗
m are observationally
equivalent to θm in that
f(ut;θm) = f(ut;θ∗
m) . (A.3)
and permute the original vector of information shares according to
ISX(θ∗
m,θv) = ISX(θm,θv) × P . (A.4)
Proof: To prove the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 note that the observational equivalence of
two mixture parametrizations θm = {γ,Ψ,W} and θ∗
m = {γ,Ψ∗,W∗} entails identity of
the variance covariance matrices V ar(ut) = γWW′ + (1 − γ)WΨW′ = γW∗W∗′ + (1 −
22γ)W∗Ψ∗W∗′. Hence, let Q be a matrix, such that W∗ = WQ, and Ψ∗ be a diagonal
matrix with distinct positive elements. Then f(ut;θm) = f(ut;θ∗
m) implies
W[γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ]W′ = WQ[γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ∗]Q′W′ . (A.5)
Multiplication of A.5 from the left with W−1 and from the right with its transpose and
rearranging terms yields
γ(In − QQ′) = (1 − γ)(QΨ∗Q′ − Ψ) . (A.6)
This holds for 0 < γ < 1 only if both sides of Equation (A.6) are zero which implies that
Ψ = QΨ∗Q′ (A.7)
and
QQ′ = In . (A.8)
It follows from Equation (A.8) that Q has to be orthogonal, i.e. Q′ = Q−1. Hence Equation
(A.7) can be regarded as a spectral decomposition of Ψ, where Ψ∗ contains the eigenvalues
of Ψ on its diagonal, and the columns of Q are the corresponding eigenvectors. As all
elements of Ψ are assumed to be distinct, the columns of Q are linearly independent, unit
length vectors. Consequently, all possible solutions for Q are given by Q = PS, where P
is an n-dimensional permutation matrix and S an n-dimensional diagonal matrix, whose
diagonal elements are either 1 or −1. Therefore W∗ = WPS, which implies that the
columns of W are identiﬁed up to multiplication by −1. However, as the main diagonal
elements of W are restricted to be greater than zero, only S = In is eligible which yields
(A.2). This implies that there exit n! permutations of the columns in W of which n! − 1
23yield a matrix W∗ which is distinct from W. The only permutation matrix that leaves the
ordering of the columns in W unchanged is P = In. Regarding Equation (A.7) it follows
that
Ψ = PSΨ∗S′P′ = PΨ∗P′ . (A.9)
Solving for Ψ∗ yields (A.1). Ψ∗ = P′ΨP is a diagonal matrix, which results from a
permutation of the diagonal elements of Ψ. This proves the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1.
To prove (A.4), start from Equation (3.5), which written in detail reads
ISX(θm,θv) =
 
ξ′W(γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ)0.5 (2)
ξ′W(γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ)W′ξ
. (A.10)
Since (A.5) holds, θm and θ∗
m imply the same covariance matrix of ut, the denominator
in Equation (A.10) is not aﬀected by the permutation of elements in W and Ψ according
to Equations (A.1) and (A.2). Therefore ISX(θ∗
m,θv) can diﬀer from ISX(θm,θv) only by
their numerators, which relate to each other by






m,θv)=ISX(θm,θv)P, such that ISX(θ∗
m,θv)  = ISX(θm,θv) ∀ P  = In. This
leaves n! − 1 distinct permutation matrices P associated with n! − 1 diﬀerent sets of mix-
ture parameters which are observationally equivalent, but imply diﬀerent information share
vectors. Thereby the proposition is proven. ￿
24Proposition 2. Denote by θm = {γ,Ψ,W} the set of mixture parameters that yields the
density of f(ut;θm) given in Equation (3.6), and by θv = {α,β,Γ1,...,Γq} a set of VECM
parameters. Suppose that the elements of the diagonal matrix Ψ are distinct. Furthermore,
let ISX(θm,θv) denote the vector of information shares given by Equation (3.5). If it holds
for the elements of W that
wi,i > 0 ∀ i
wi,i > |wj,i| ∀ j  = i
(A.11)
then there exists only one set of mixture parameters θ = {γ,Ψ,W}, given by
γ = 1 − γ
Ψ = Ψ−1
W = WΨ0.5 ,
(A.12)
that is observationally equivalent to θm in that f(ut;θm) = f(ut;θm). Furthermore, the
parametrization θm implies
ISX(θm,θv) = ISX(θm,θv) . (A.13)
Proof: Let Q be a matrix, such that W = WQ, then it has to hold that
W[γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ]W′ = WQ[(1 − γ)In + γΨ]Q′W′ . (A.14)
By multiplying (A.14) from the left with W−1 and from the right with its transpose and
rearranging terms yields
γ(In − QΨQ′) = (1 − γ)(QQ′ − Ψ) . (A.15)
25This holds only if both sides of Equation (A.15) are zero, which implies that QΨQ′ = In
and that QQ′ = Ψ. The latter equation gives Q = Ψ0.5, and using this result for the
ﬁrst yields Ψ = Ψ−1 and W = WΨ0.5, which shows Equation (A.12). The restrictions in
(A.11) rule out permuting the columns of W and the diagonal elements of Ψ. Without
these restrictions   W = WP and   Ψ = PΨP′ with P  = In would yield n!−1 observationally
equivalent parametrizations. Thereby the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 is proven.
Since (A.14) holds, the vector ISX(θm) can only diﬀer from ISX(θm) by the vectors in the
numerators, but
[ξ′W(γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ)0.5](2) = [ξ′WΨ0.5((1 − γ)In + γΨ−1)0.5](2)
= [ξ′W((1 − γ)ΨIn + γΨΨ−1)0.5](2)
= [ξ′W(γIn + (1 − γ)Ψ)0.5](2) .
(A.16)
As the right hand side of (A.16) is the numerator of ISX(θm) it follows that ISX(θm) =
ISX(θm) which proves the second part of Proposition 2. ￿
26B Bootstrap
We conduct a parametric bootstrap to provide standard errors and conﬁdence intervals for
parameter and information share estimates resulting from the two-step estimation proce-
dure outlined in Section 3.3. The procedure works as follows. We ﬁrst draw an iid sequence
of random variables from a normal mixture distribution. This distribution is generated us-
ing the mixture parameters which are estimated in the second (Maximum Likelihood) step
of the estimation procedure. Next, we generate simulated price series according to Equa-
tion (2.1) using observations from the original price series as starting values, the estimated
or pre-speciﬁed cointegrating vectors, the ﬁrst step OLS estimates of the VECM param-
eters, and the simulated mixture residuals. The length of the simulated series equals the
number of observations in the original data set plus 100. We discard the ﬁrst 100 data
points in order to reduce the dependence on the starting values. The two-step estimation
procedure described in Section 3.3 is then applied to the simulated data. We store the
resulting parameter estimates and compute estimates of ξ using (2.2), upper and lower
bounds of Hasbrouck information shares according to (2.4), and ISX information shares
according to (3.5). This procedure is repeated B = 399 times, as suggested by Davidson
and MacKinnon (2000). They recommend choosing the number of bootstrap replications
B such that α(B + 1) is an integer. B = 399 implies that the 20th largest bootstrap
estimate is the critical value at α = 0.05. Standard errors for parameter and information
share estimates are computed from the empirical distribution of the bootstrap estimates.
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of composite price innovations. The lines result from a regression





















, ψ1 = 10, ψ2 = 10, γ = 0.9
Figure 2: Scatter plots of composite price innovations with DGPs revealed. Data are gener-
ated by bivariate mixture distributions. The small dots represent observations from regime 1, the
circles represent observations from regime 2. The lines result from regressions of u1 on u2 using
data from the respective regimes.
34Ford Daimler
General Motors Fiat
Figure 3: Scatterplots of VECM residuals. The four panels show scatterplots of residuals
from the ﬁrst step VECM estimation for four reference entities. u1 are CDS residuals, u2
credit spread residuals. The lines result from a regression of u1 on u2.
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Country Sector Rating pCDS pCS ∆pCDS ∆pCS ∆pCDS ∆pCS Corr
AOL United States Internet BBB 93.20 80.17 5.48 7.46 17.04 14.54 0.02
Bank of Am. United States Banking A 36.14 39.69 2.58 4.41 12.24 4.73 0.07
Bank One United States Banking A 45.17 50.78 2.71 5.90 5.79 0.51 -0.02
Bear Stearns United States Banking A 71.40 80.93 3.84 6.76 9.83 1.66 0.02
Citigroup United States Banking AA 32.17 26.43 2.72 4.94 9.88 0.70 -0.02
Fleet Boston United States Banking A 49.32 44.08 2.05 4.99 12.31 17.77 0.19
Ford United States Automobile/ﬁnance BBB 143.47 140.89 7.57 6.70 7.31 6.57 0.26
GE Capital United States Finance AAA 30.40 7.18 2.27 5.56 71.63 0.63 0.07
General Mot. United States Automobile/ﬁnance BBB 119.04 108.39 5.72 6.6 4.22 0.915 0.15
Goldman Sachs United States Banking A 51.91 55.72 2.98 5.40 7.62 0.80 -0.01
JPMorgan United States Banking AA 44.52 42.02 2.67 3.8 7.82 2.648 -0.10
Morgan St. United States Banking AA 47.67 47.98 3.21 4.97 18.69 4.82 0.03
Lehman Bros. United States Banking A 69.86 77.61 3.82 7.28 6.80 1.80 -0.03
Merrill Lynch United States Banking AA 50.24 43.56 2.98 5.58 18.08 0.67 -0.02
Wal Mart United States Retail AA 19.77 -0.85 0.99 4.59 43.99 9.30 0.04
Wells Fargo United States Banking A 26.32 30.17 2.38 5.37 15.60 3.78 -0.07
British Tel. United Kingdom Telecom. A 103.02 113.04 4.12 4.69 2.67 0.60 0.27
Commerzbank Germany Banking A 27.31 14.70 1.11 3.64 32.73 0.44 -0.07
Daimler Germany Automobile BBB 128.50 120.65 4.92 6.01 3.65 1.15 0.28
Deutsche Tel. Germany Telecom. BBB 144.64 121.46 7.70 4.67 5.34 4.36 0.47
Fiat Italy Automobi A 106.30 100.52 4.48 3.27 5.95 3.60 0.31
Iberdrola Spain Utilities A 32.54 49.25 1.01 3.00 40.57 17.80 0.04
Metro Germany Retail BBB 62.94 80.29 1.99 3.55 42.29 6.70 0.06
Siemens Germany Telecom. AA 44.69 33.68 2.04 3.47 9.43 33.48 0.12
Telefonica Spain Telecom. A 85.65 73.31 4.06 2.75 10.13 0.77 0.22
Volvo Sweden Automobile A 72.50 79.83 3.95 2.86 19.19 4.18 0.13
Table 1: Data descriptives. The table lists the reference entities and basic descriptives of CDS prices and corporate bond spreads.
We report the mean of the CDS price and credit spreads (in basis points) as well as the standard deviation, kurtosis and correlation of
their ﬁrst diﬀerences. The sampling period is January 2, 2001 to June 20, 2002 (383 trading days).
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6Reference Entity ψ1 ψ2 γ w11 w12 w21 w22 Wald test
AOL 14954.11 4.85 0.675 0.086 -0.020 0.004 4.711 892
(1279.24) (0.81) (0.038) (0.197) (0.029) (0.048) (0.207) < 0.01
Bank of Am. 363.19 1.42 0.640 0.203 0.014 0.032 3.865 375
(73.77) (0.26) (0.030) (0.061) (0.022) (0.032) (0.211) < 0.01
Bank One 32.86 1.37 0.655 0.737 -0.053 0.102 4.971 119
(5.94) (0.28) (0.039) (0.064) (0.065) (0.099) (0.262) < 0.01
Bear Stearns 119.04 1.90 0.660 0.587 0.000 0.014 5.122 184
(21.41) (0.35) (0.031) (0.076) (0.054) (0.074) (0.265) < 0.01
Citigroup 66.63 0.84 0.657 0.535 0.010 0.045 4.652 290
(11.59) (0.15) (0.034) (0.049) (0.044) (0.054) (0.212) < 0.01
FleetBoston 71.81 1.72 0.634 0.110 -0.008 0.061 3.834 329
(132.47) (0.36) (0.035) (0.057) (0.018) (0.044) (0.257) < 0.01
Ford 22.85 6.44 0.664 2.654 -0.199 0.765 3.655 12
(4.19) (1.17) (0.037) (0.194) (0.401) (0.324) (0.284) < 0.01
GE Capital 1588.61 1.63 0.704 0.155 0.002 0.036 4.734 438
(383.33) (0.35) (0.023) (0.058) (0.011) (0.036) (0.208) < 0.01
General Mot. 28.99 2.10 0.634 1.523 0.132 0.342 4.883 65
(5.50) (0.43) (0.045) (0.151) (0.182) (0.137) (0.357) < 0.01
Goldman Sachs 123.07 1.15 0.656 0.428 -0.056 0.015 4.693 325
(21.72) (0.22) (0.031) (0.055) (0.037) (0.047) (0.247) < 0.01
JPMorgan 1229.12 4.52 0.618 0.105 -0.023 -0.011 2.171 367
(208.01) (0.85) (0.033) (0.081) (0.031) (0.029) (0.169) < 0.01
Morgan St. 345.38 2.22 0.664 0.293 -0.021 0.025 4.029 269
(40.36) (0.48) (0.029) (0.076) (0.042) (0.030) (0.109) < 0.01
Lehman Bros. 82.70 1.07 0.636 0.612 -0.007 -0.027 6.210 208
(65.20) (0.40) (0.028) (0.068) (0.027) (0.040) (0.210) < 0.01
Merrill Lynch 861.94 0.92 0.660 0.172 -0.014 -0.008 4.995 882
(14.51) (0.20) (0.034) (0.076) (0.060) (0.072) (0.344) < 0.01
Wal Mart 408.64 2.16 0.707 0.138 -0.007 0.054 4.087 213
(164.31) (0.15) (0.031) (0.080) (0.018) (0.027) (0.231) < 0.01
Wells Fargo 82.85 1.42 0.679 0.496 0.000 -0.022 4.529 110
(84.48) (0.53) (0.020) (0.018) (0.009) (0.055) (0.174) < 0.01
British Tel. 725.77 1.17 0.607 0.201 0.031 0.059 4.157 505
(14.65) (0.31) (0.030) (0.044) (0.038) (0.073) (0.223) < 0.01
Commerzbank 488.85 0.66 0.709 0.151 -0.003 -0.038 3.229 233
(149.08) (0.24) (0.035) (0.119) (0.037) (0.042) (0.277) < 0.01
Daimler 39.52 2.14 0.621 1.04 0.013 0.388 4.277 83
(112.52) (0.24) (0.023) (0.032) (0.011) (0.033) (0.153) < 0.01
Deutsche Tel. 173.24 3.66 0.591 0.730 -0.064 0.227 2.298 115
(8.17) (0.44) (0.043) (0.123) (0.139) (0.101) (0.334) < 0.01
Fiat 310.05 1.19 0.623 0.352 -0.001 0.074 2.713 126
(38.51) (0.72) (0.033) (0.206) (0.137) (0.073) (0.210) < 0.01
Iberdrola 632.95 5.58 0.708 0.117 -0.007 0.020 2.138 188
(64.74) (0.30) (0.043) (0.149) (0.062) (0.039) (0.209) < 0.01
Metro 485.80 8.20 0.691 0.199 -0.043 0.022 2.115 166
(139.85) (1.28) (0.020) (0.019) (0.008) (0.040) (0.088) < 0.01
Siemens 1393.36 4.14 0.667 0.098 -0.010 0.022 2.223 395
(103.40) (1.82) (0.028) (0.046) (0.023) (0.056) (0.112) < 0.01
Telefonica 567.30 1.46 0.651 0.275 0.004 0.044 2.291 600
(250.22) (0.82) (0.036) (0.075) (0.021) (0.039) (0.130) < 0.01
Volvo 225.96 2.79 0.666 0.460 0.075 0.052 2.124 261
(117.30) (0.25) (0.030) (0.105) (0.031) (0.023) (0.118) < 0.01
Table 2: Mixture model estimation results. The table shows second step ML estimates of the mixture
parameters using the ﬁrst step VECM residuals as input. The CDS price is the ﬁrst series, the bond spread
the second. In parentheses we report standard errors from a parametric bootstrap (see Appendix B). The
last column gives the values of the Wald statistic for a test of ψ1 = ψ2 along with the corresponding p-values.
37Reference Entity λCS ξCDS ξCS Hasbrouck IS(CDS) ISX(CDS)
low up mid
Ford 0.58 0.31 0.22 52.3 80.0 66.2 83.4
(0.21) (0.09) (0.08) (20.3) (16.9) (18.3) (16.8)
Daimler 0.81 0.48 0.12 71.3 94.1 82.7 93.9
(0.23) (0.12) (0.11) (21.8) (14.2) (17.6) (23.0)
Telefonica 0.59 0.29 0.20 65.9 87.0 76.4 86.9
(0.25) (0.12) (0.10) (23.3) (20.0) (21.4) (13.3)
Fiat 0.79 0.45 0.11 79.4 97.6 88.5 97.6
(0.20) (0.16) (0.14) (20.2) (12.5) (15.8) (8.9)
General Mot. 0.75 0.40 0.14 72.1 90.1 81.1 88.3
(0.23) (0.07) (0.06) (16.0) (11.0) (13.1) (11.0)
Volvo 0.52 0.26 0.24 59.0 76.5 67.8 74.5
(0.22) (0.08) (0.07) (20.4) (17.8) (18.8) (18.0)
British Tel. 0.87 0.50 0.07 82.9 97.8 90.3 97.5
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (20.9) (13.5) (16.7) (15.6)
FleetBoston 0.93 0.48 0.04 84.2 97.1 90.7 97.3
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (19.4) (10.7) (14.3) (9.6)
Commerzbank 0.82 0.42 0.09 69.0 76.9 72.9 69.2
(0.24) (0.07) (0.04) (20.9) (22.7) (21.6) (13.1)
Wal Mart 0.85 0.41 0.07 58.1 65.8 62.0 66.5
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (21.2) (20.5) (20.7) (9.7)
Siemens 0.88 0.45 0.06 88.7 95.8 92.2 96.1
(0.23) (0.10) (0.08) (18.0) (14.0) (15.8) (12.4)
Deutsche Tel. 0.72 0.83 -0.33 89.6 95.2 92.4 94.6
(0.16) (0.99) (0.89) (23.7) (9.5) (14.5) (13.8)
Iberdrola 0.77 0.40 0.12 58.9 64.5 61.7 65.3
(0.23) (0.07) (0.05) (22.2) (21.8) (21.9) (9.1)
Citigroup 0.72 0.33 0.13 65.8 70.7 68.3 70.4
(0.15) (0.04) (0.03) (14.9) (13.7) (14.0) (13.6)
Bank One 0.69 0.30 0.14 51.5 56.0 53.8 58.2
(0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (16.7) (16.2) (16.2) (14.8)
Bank of Am. 0.93 0.43 0.03 95.5 98.7 97.1 98.5
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (17.0) (13.5) (15.0) (11.5)
Morgan St. 0.83 0.42 0.09 88.4 91.3 89.8 91.7
(0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (16.1) (14.2) (15.0) (18.0)
Wells Fargo 0.75 0.33 0.11 67.1 68.1 68.1 67.1
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (18.4) (17.2) (17.2) (19.6)
Lehman Bros. 0.80 0.39 0.10 84.0 86.0 85.0 84.2
(0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (10.9) (11.1) (10.9) (12.8)
GECapital 0.98 0.53 0.01 97.8 99.8 98.8 99.8
(0.16) (0.08) (0.05) (10.1) (7.5) (8.6) (7.9)
Metro 0.88 0.43 0.06 94.0 95.4 94.7 96.8
(0.19) (0.07) (0.06) (15.0) (13.8) (14.2) (20.5)
Bear Stearns 0.78 0.36 0.10 82.5 83.7 83.1 83.7
(0.16) (0.04) (0.04) (14.1) (13.1) (13.4) (12.1)
Merrill Lynch 0.90 0.43 0.05 96.5 97.7 97.1 96.7
(0.26) (0.05) (0.04) (8.7) (9.3) (8.9) (10.1)
JPMorgan 0.94 0.47 0.03 99.2 100.0 99.6 99.4
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (11.6) (13.7) (12.4) (10.5)
AOL 0.97 0.48 0.01 99.6 99.9 99.7 99.9
(0.23) (0.08) (0.07) (6.4) (5.2) (5.7) (6.9)
Goldman Sachs 0.80 0.37 0.10 84.1 84.1 84.1 85.6
(0.21) (0.04) (0.04) (12.9) (12.6) (12.5) (11.5)
Mean 0.81 0.42 0.08 78.4 86.6 82.5 86.3
Std. Dev. 0.11 0.10 0.10 15.2 12.9 13.5 13.0
Table 3: Alternative measures for contributions to price discovery. The table reports the
adjustment coeﬃcient ratio (λCS =
|αCS|
|αCS|+|αCDS|), long run impact coeﬃcients (ξCDS and ξCS), Hasbrouck
information shares for the CDS price (lower bound, upper bound, midpoint) and modiﬁed information shares
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